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Introduction
Racial segregation and racial differences in residential locations in the United States are among
the most heavily studied areas of social science (e.g., Du Bois 1899; Franklin 1956; Schelling
1971; Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999). An influential
stylized fact in this literature is the concentration of Black individuals in large central cities—over
40 percent lived in the 40 most populous cities in 1970. However, the share of the Black population
living in these central cities has fallen to 24 percent over the last half century, while the share living
in their suburbs has risen from 16 to 36 percent. This population shift is similar in magnitude to
the second wave of the Great Migration, which had long-lasting implications for racial segregation
and Black outcomes more broadly (e.g., Collins and Wanamaker 2014; Black et al. 2015; Boustan
2016; Derenoncourt 2019). Although Black suburbanization may have similarly important effects,
particularly for outcomes related to residential sorting and neighborhood composition, economists
have done little research on the topic.
This paper conducts the first dedicated economic analysis of Black suburbanization, provid-
ing three stylized facts that update our understanding of spatial disparities in the United States.
First, most relative gains in Black households’ neighborhood characteristics since 1970 have oc-
curred through suburbanization—Black city dwellers generally lost ground on the average house-
hold. Second, suburbanization has been associated with growing income segregation within Black
households, accounting for well over half of the major increase that has occurred over the past
50 years. We show that selective suburbanization of high-income Black households and relatively
low “White flight” in the suburbs help explain these two patterns. Third, total Black population
in cities has declined steeply since 2000, driven by sharp decreases among young people and in
high-poverty, majority-Black neighborhoods. In the same way that the geography of race in the
twentieth century can only be understood in the context of the Great Migration, Black suburban-
ization and these associated trends are essential background for research and policy related to
geographic racial disparities in the present.
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We begin our analysis by documenting aggregate population trends in Section 1. We focus
on a sample of 40 core-based statistical areas (CBSAs)—the 20 largest in the South and in the
remainder of the country, defined according to total CBSA population in 1970. There have been
drastic increases in both the share of the country’s Black population (16 to 36 percent) and the
total number of Black individuals (4 million to 13 million) living in the suburbs of these areas.
In contrast, Black population in these central cities remained flat until 2000 and then declined
significantly, leading their share of the national total to fall from 41 to 24 percent. While prior
work has also noted this aggregate shift—most recently Logan (2014) and Frey (2015)—we add
depth in several ways. We show that Black population growth in a metro area’s suburbs is typically
widespread and geographically diffuse and that Black population has declined since 2000 in nearly
every large central city. In addition, in both cities and suburbs, Black population change in a census
tract varies greatly with its initial characteristics.
In Section 2, we develop our first stylized fact—suburbanization has accounted for most gains
in Black households’ neighborhood characteristics in our sample. For example, while the neigh-
borhood income of the average Black individual has modestly improved from 61 to 66 percent of
the average White individual’s neighborhood income, the figure has fallen from 58 percent to 50
for Black city dwellers. Similarly, the number of majority-Black, above-median income census
tracts in the suburbs has nearly doubled since 1980, while the number in cities has fallen. These
results suggest that Black households have largely achieved neighborhood improvements through
migration, rather than through improvements in city neighborhoods that were initially majority
Black, consistent with Wilson (1987)’s observations.1 More broadly, this mixed progress on spa-
tial outcomes bears similarities to trends in Black-White gaps in income and education. While
the average gaps stagnated after 1980 (Altonji and Blank 1999; Neal 2006), the upper and lower
portions of the Black income distribution followed opposite trajectories (Bayer and Charles 2018).
1Wilson (1987, p. 6): “. . . today’s black middle class professionals no longer tend to live in [segregated black
city] neighborhoods and have moved increasingly into mainstream occupations outside the black community [...].
Accompanying the black middle-class exodus has been a growing movement of stable working-class blacks [...] to
higher-income neighborhoods in other parts of the city and to the suburbs. In the earlier years, the black middle and
working classes were confined by restrictive covenants to communities also inhabited by the lower class[.]”
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To better understand the mechanisms underlying these divergent neighborhood outcomes, we
study both Black suburbanizers and the White response to their arrival. We first find evidence
that Black suburbanizers are positively selected on income, although data limitations restrict this
exercise to a subset of the main sample. Next, using microdata from Infutor Data Solutions, we
show that suburbanizers from city neighborhoods that are over 80 percent Black tend to move
to neighborhoods with higher socioeconomic status (SES) and higher housing costs than their
origins.2 Finally, we use some basic statistics and a replication of Boustan (2010)’s empirical
strategy to show that “White flight has been much lower in the recent suburban setting than it was
in central cities in earlier time periods (Card, Mas and Rothstein 2008; Shertzer and Walsh 2019;
Derenoncourt 2019). This helps explain why middle-class Black households in the suburbs have
been able to sustain gains in neighborhood SES, while they frequently did not in other settings
(Pattillo-McCoy 2000; Derenoncourt 2019).
In Section 3, we turn to our second stylized fact—suburbanization’s important role in the rapid
increase in Black income segregation, which has nearly doubled since 1970 (Bischoff and Rear-
don 2014).3 This trend is of particular interest because of Wilson (1987)’s influential argument
that growing class stratification would have a number of negative effects on majority-Black city
neighborhoods. We show that changes within central cities account for less than a quarter of the
increase in income segregation indices. Instead, suburbanization and sorting within the suburbs
explain the vast majority. To give a concrete example, the share of high-earning Black households
living in high-poverty neighborhoods has fallen from 30 percent in 1970 to 20 percent today. The
decrease is entirely driven by a large drop in the suburbs and the increase in the suburban share of
total Black population—the figure has remained constant at about 40 percent in central cities.
The analysis in the first two sections illustrates that while many Black households have achieved
significant gains through suburbanization, those in the city have instead seen neighborhood SES
2We are only able to consider suburbanizers from mostly Black neighborhoods because the Infutor data do not
identify individual race.
3An important caveat is that our results on segregation are measured at the tract level. Logan and Parman (2017)
show that within-tract measures of racial segregation show different patterns than tract or ward measures in the early
and mid-twentieth century. This issue could be particularly important in our setting given that suburban tracts are
physically larger than city tracts.
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and population decline. These equilibrium effects in cities are an important part of the total inci-
dence of Black suburbanization. In Section 4, we explore Black population decline in central cities
in detail to provide our third stylized fact.
We first consider how patterns differ across cities and neighborhoods. Total Black population
has fallen in nearly every large central city since 2000, regardless of region or economic trajectory.
The decline is concentrated in high-poverty and majority-Black neighborhoods—census tracts that
met these criteria in 1970 have since lost 60 percent of their Black population and 40 percent of
total population. Population decline on this scale is a policy concern because it is associated with
negative effects like school closures and reduced retail or grocery options.4 Notably, the aggregate
loss is not driven by gentrification of initially high-poverty areas—the vast majority of the total
decline has occurred in areas that remain majority Black and high poverty today.
We then consider how migration and other demographic changes have contributed to the popu-
lation decline. Population trends in our sample period may be affected by falling fertility rates and
the echo effects of the Baby Boom and the Great Migration on age structures and death rates (Bous-
tan and Shertzer 2013, Black et al. 2015). To separate suburbanization—and migration generally—
from these forces, we use a simple demographic projection. We find that the natural growth rate of
the central city Black population (defined as expected births minus expected deaths) has steadily
slowed, accounting for about a third of the decline since 2000. The remaining two-thirds results
from an increasing shortfall between the projected natural growth rate and actual growth, as cities
have attracted and retained fewer Black households on net. Although out-migration of established
households is often more salient, we find that the recent increase in the migration shortfall is instead
driven by people under the age of 35. Broadly, these results highlight that city Black population
decline results from demographic change and migratory churn and not only elevated out-migration.
Taken together, our results illustrate two main themes. First, Black outcomes, both neighbor-
hood and individual, have diverged in cities and suburbs on a variety of dimensions (at least within
4Small et al. (2018) show that while high-poverty neighborhoods generally lost total population between 1970 and
1990, there has recently been heterogeneity across cities in different regions. However, in majority-Black high-poverty
neighborhoods, all regions continued to see depopulation after 1990.
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our sample of large metropolitan areas). Second, historically Black neighborhoods in central cities
have experienced dramatic declines in both Black and total population, with associated decreases
in income and increases in poverty. When we investigate the “causes of [these] effects,” in the
spirit of Gelman and Imbens (2013), evidence suggests that declining White flight in the suburbs,
rising Black incomes, selective suburbanization of high-SES Black households, and broad demo-
graphic trends play important roles, but gentrification does not. Prior literature points to several
other factors that may be important: job suburbanization (Miller 2020), changing relative amenities
in cities and suburbs (Baum-Snow and Lutz 2011; Baum-Snow and Hartley 2020),5 and declining
housing discrimination in the suburbs (Bostic and Martin 2005; Turner et al. 2013). Our results
also point to several “effects of causes” questions, such as how fair housing ordinances changed
Black location decisions, or how suburban neighborhoods affect economic and social outcomes of
Black households.
In addition to drawing attention to these themes, our results have implications for several areas
of research and policy. First, programs that move households from high- to low-poverty areas (e.g.,
Moving to Opportunity) may have negative externalities on sending neighborhoods that are already
suffering from severe population decline. Related research could also benefit from further study-
ing Black suburbanization, as it represents a large-scale migration to generally higher-opportunity
neighborhoods. Second, policies intended to reverse Black city population decline should address
the attraction and retention of young people, rather than focusing only on retaining long-term res-
idents. Finally and most broadly, improvements in racial discrimination in the labor or housing
market may have heterogeneous impacts across space due to both sorting effects and differen-
tial direct effects across subsets of people (Wilson 1987; Aliprantis and Carroll 2018). Spatially
targeted aid may be needed to counteract these effects.
The most directly related academic work is the long sociology literature on Black suburban-
ization (Farley 1970; Logan and Schneider 1984; Massey and Denton 1988; Alba and Logan
1991; Galster 1991; Schneider and Phelan 1993; Alba, Logan and Stults 2000; Logan 2014; Frey
5For some neighborhoods, capital destruction and long-run stigma associated with civil disturbances in the late
1960s may be important in driving relative amenity changes (Casey and Hardy 2018; Brooks et al. 2020).
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2015).6 The work is concentrated in the 1980s, when minority population in suburbs began to grow
rapidly. Scholars documented, in a variety of contexts, that while the neighborhoods of Black sub-
urbanites were generally higher income and whiter than the neighborhoods of Black city dwellers,
they were nonetheless lower income and less White than the neighborhoods of White suburbanites
with similar characteristics. We build on these initial facts by illustrating the important role that
suburbanization has played in aggregate changes in Black neighborhood composition and income
segregation over the past 50 years. In addition, we illustrate several important mechanisms that
explain how these patterns have emerged. Finally, we connect suburbanization to the recent Black
population decline in cities and explore the roles of net migration, evolving demographics, and
neighborhood conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes our data and sample and provides a novel in-
vestigation of aggregate trends in Black suburban and central city populations since 1970. Section
2 examines how suburbanization has related to changes in neighborhood characteristics for Black
households in cities and suburbs. Section 3 then explores the association between suburbanization
and income segregation of Black households. In Section 4, we turn to cities and study the extent
and causes of the decline in the Black central city population. Section 5 concludes by discussing
potential economic and social implications of these patterns and areas for future research.
1 Data and Aggregate Trends
1.1 Data and Sample
Our primary dataset is a panel of census tract characteristics spanning 1970 to 2016. We draw tract
characteristics from the 1970–2010 decennial censuses and the 2014–2018 American Community
Survery (ACS), as standardized by Ruggles et al. (2020). We then map the characteristics into
consistent 2010 tract boundaries using code provided by Logan, Xu and Stults (2014). We define
metropolitan areas according to the most recent definition of core-based statistical areas (CBSAs),
6In addition to quantitative work, a number of ethnographies have examined Black suburbanites and the Black
middle class more generally (e.g., Pattillo 1999; Lacy 2007).
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central cities according to 2010 census place boundaries, and suburbs as a CBSA less its central
city. To classify tracts into census place definitions, we use the Missouri Census Data Center’s
Geocorr tool.7 We define Black as non-Hispanic Black alone, thus excluding Hispanic Black and
individuals who report more than one race from being categorized as Black.8
Finally, we restrict to 40 populous metropolitan areas that serve as our primary sample. We
select those with the largest total CBSA population in 1970 in order to focus on areas that were
initially large, as well as to prevent baseline city versus suburban shares from entering the selection
criteria. Since trends could differ between southern cities and cities in other parts of the United
States because of, for example, differences in exposure to the Great Migration, we choose the 20
largest CBSAs from states that seceded in the Civil War and the 20 largest from the remainder of
the country. We loosely refer to this set as the 40 largest cities, although it actually excludes a
few northern cities that were in the national top 40.9 In total, the metropolitan areas in our sample
contained 57 percent of the national Black population in 1970 and 60 percent in 2016. Appendix
Table A1 shows some basic summary statistics on population and racial composition in the 32,000
tracts included in our primary sample, and Appendix Table A2 shows their distribution across
CBSAs, cities, and suburbs.10
We supplement the primary sample with two sources of microdata on migration from central
cities to surrounding suburbs. First, the 1980 and 1990 long-form censuses allow us to identify
households that suburbanized in the previous five years in about half of the sample CBSAs. This
data also contain household demographic characteristics. Second, Infutor Data Solutions provides
longitudinal individual address histories for the 2010–2016 time period, which have recently been
7This tool is available at https://mcdc.missouri.edu/applications/geocorr.html.
8Research has found that self-reported racial identity may respond to discrimination and other features of the social
environment (Dahis, Nix and Qian 2020). We are unable to investigate the role of changing self-reported racial identity
in driving our results, but this is an important topic for future research.
9The CBSAs included are Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Birmingham, AL; Boston, MA; Buffalo, NY; Charleston,
SC; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, OH; Dallas, TX; Detroit, MI; El Paso, TX; Greensboro,
NC; Houston, TX; Jacksonville, FL; Kansas City, MO; Knoxville, TN; Los Angeles, CA; Memphis, TN; Miami, FL;
Milwaukee, WI; Minneapolis, MN; Nashville, TN; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; Orlando, FL; Philadelphia, PA;
Pittsburgh, PA; Providence, RI; Richmond, VA; San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA; San Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA;
St. Louis, MO; Tampa, FL; Virginia Beach, VA; Washington, DC; Winston-Salem, NC.
10In a few cases, we classify multiple municipalities within one CBSA as a central city. These are Minneapolis and
St. Paul; Oakland and San Francisco; and Kansas City, Missouri, and Kansas City, Kansas.
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used in a number of academic research papers (e.g. Diamond, McQuade and Qian 2019, Mast
2021). The address histories are created from a variety of public and private record sources, in-
cluding USPS change of addresses, property records, phone books, and magazine subscriptions.
The data have poor coverage of young adults but closely tracks the over-25 population at the tract
level, with about 0.9 observations per individual reported in the census. It reports location of res-
idence at the address level, along with an estimated move date. However, the data do not provide
an individual’s race, which limits its applications in our study. Additional information on both of
these sources is available in Appendix I.
1.2 Aggregate Trends in Suburban and Urban Black Population
A central stylized fact about the racial geography of the United States is that the Black population
was disproportionately concentrated in the central cities of large metropolitan areas at the conclu-
sion of the Great Migration in approximately 1970 (Farley et al. 1978). We begin our analysis
with a detailed investigation of how this fact has changed. The top panel of Figure 1 shows the
distribution of Black population across different types of places from 1970 to 2016. There has been
a large decline in the share living in our 40 sample central cities, from 42 percent to 24 percent,
and a corresponding rise in the share in the suburbs of those cities, while the share living in all
other areas has remained roughly constant.11 The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the total Black
population in each of these categories—suburban and other areas have increased sharply, while
the number in large cities stayed flat through 2000 before beginning to decline. Appendix II.A
discusses how these general population trends vary across regions.
While a large literature dating to the 1970s has documented some of these aggregate trends in
Black suburbanization, important features have not been explored or not been connected system-
atically across disparate studies. First, suburbanization has been widespread across neighborhoods
and metropolitan areas. Figure 2 illustrates this using the Los Angeles area as an example, and
11The trends for Black population look quite different than for White or Hispanic population, as shown in Appendix
Figures A1 and A2. The shares have remained relatively stable for White population, while all areas saw rapid growth
in Hispanic population.
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Appendix Figures A3–A5 do the same for Chicago, Houston, and New York. In all cases, Black
population was highly concentrated in a concentrated set of neighborhoods within each city proper
in 1970 but has since dispersed widely, driven by both a decline in the share of tracts with nearly
no Black households and a growth in the number of tracts with moderate or high numbers of
Black households. This growth in areas that previously were entirely non-Black is consistent with
evidence from earlier periods (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999).
Second, the recent decline in central city Black population has occurred in nearly every large
city, as shown in Appendix Figure A6, which plots the change since 2000 for the 13 cities with
largest initial Black population. Despite the varying economic trajectories of these cities, all lost
Black population between 2000 and 2016, and the drop was larger than 9 percent in 9 of the 13.
Declines are even larger when removing Black immigrants (Appendix Figure A7).
Third, the magnitude of these changes varies significantly by baseline tract income and racial
composition. We stratify tracts by their 1970 characteristics in Table 1 to illustrate this heterogene-
ity. In Panel A, we see that the city decline is concentrated in neighborhoods that were initially
majority Black, where Black population has fallen from 7.5 million in 1970 to 3.7 million today.
The drop is even larger in areas that were majority Black and high poverty (over 20 percent),
which lost 60 percent of their Black population. Moreover, as shown in Panel B, total population
in these neighborhoods fell by nearly 40 percent. In contrast, Black and total population in city
neighborhoods that were not initially majority Black have grown substantially.
Surprisingly, Black population also fell in suburban tracts that were majority-Black in 1970,
declining from 1.7 to 1.2 million. Meanwhile, the Black population in suburban neighborhoods
that were not majority Black in 1970 increased over sevenfold, from 1.8 million to 13 million.
This stark heterogeneity across tracts within cities and suburbs suggests that important dynamics
related to income and class underlie the aggregate shift of Black population toward the suburbs,
and the migration is large enough to potentially change basic patterns of neighborhood quality and
income segregation. This pattern motivates our analysis in the next two sections.
9
2 City-Suburb Divergence in Neighborhood Characteristics
In addition to concentration in central cities, a second important stylized fact is that Black house-
holds have historically lived in segregated neighborhoods that were poorer and had lower average
educational attainment than White households’ neighborhoods, even conditional on household in-
come (Pattillo 2005; Reardon, Fox and Townsend 2015). In this section, we investigate whether
the suburbanization documented in Section 1.2 has changed this historical pattern. In our sample
metropolitan areas, average neighborhood income and poverty rates have improved only moder-
ately relative to White households since 1970. However, we show that these modest aggregate
changes mask diverging outcomes in suburbs and central cities. These improvements are entirely
driven by a combination of the rising share of Black households living in the suburbs (baseline
neighborhood indicators are higher in the suburbs) and improving neighborhood characteristics
within the suburbs, while relative neighborhood indicators for Black households living in central
cities actually fell over this time period. We then study forces that may drive the divergence, in-
cluding Black migration patterns, equilibrium responses of other races, and changes in the Black
income distribution.
2.1 Evolution of neighborhood characteristics in cities and suburbs
We begin by considering neighborhood median household income. We plot the mean for Black
individuals in cities and suburbs in Figure 3, normalizing each year by the mean neighborhood in-
come for all White individuals in the sample. The trend has been modestly upward in aggregate—
from 61 percent to 66 percent of mean White neighborhood income—but cities and suburbs have
moved in opposite directions. Black relative neighborhood income in the suburbs increased from
72 percent in 1970 to 78 percent in 1990 before declining slightly, while cities have steadily de-
clined from 58 percent to 50 percent. Of course, the overall average is pulled upward by both
improvements in the suburban average and the increasing share of Black households living in
suburbs. A similar result appears for neighborhood poverty rate, while the neighborhood college
10
share has increased rapidly everywhere due to the sharp national increase in college attainment.
Appendix II.A shows that this pattern holds within each census region. The divergence suggests
that Black households have generally obtained neighborhood improvements through migration,
rather than because of improvement in historically Black city neighborhoods.
The trends in average neighborhood income raise a related question—what types of suburban
neighborhoods are Black households living in? Appendix Figure A8 illustrates that Black sub-
urbanites reside in an increasingly diverse set of tracts, while most Black city dwellers live in
low-income and majority-Black neighborhoods. Panel A shows that nearly 50 percent of Black
suburbanites lived in majority-Black neighborhoods in 1970, but this figure had fallen to around
35 percent by 2016. Meanwhile, the share in a tract with no racial majority rose from around 5
percent to almost 30 percent. Turning to Panel C, which shows the share of Black suburbanites
living in neighborhoods in different median income ranges, we see that the share in tracts with
median income below $60,000 (in 2018 dollars) has declined sharply, while the share living in
higher-income neighborhoods has grown commensurately. In contrast, Panels B and D show that
the distribution of neighborhood types among Black city dwellers has been relatively stagnant.12
2.2 Mechanisms
These findings suggest that improvements in Black neighborhood characteristics were driven by
both improvements among Black households living in the suburbs and a rising Black suburban
share. In this section, we first provide evidence on how reduced White flight and selective migra-
tion by Black households contributed to improvements in the suburbs. We then discuss the factors
that contributed to the rising share of Black households living in the suburbs.
12This distribution of neighborhood types occurred through widespread growth in suburban Black population. Ap-
pendix Figure A9 shows substantial growth in suburban tracts with a wide variety of baseline 1970 demographic
characteristics.
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2.2.1 Suburban White flight
The results in the previous subsection suggest that Black suburbanization has netted many house-
holds improvements in neighborhood characteristics and led Black households to live in a wide
variety of suburban areas with different income levels and racial compositions. Although there are
certainly suburban areas that are majority Black and quite poor, this is still a stark contrast to the
outcome of the Great Migration, when White households rapidly fled central city neighborhoods in
response to Black arrivals, resulting in extreme racial segregation and high levels of concentrated
poverty (Boustan 2010; Derenoncourt 2019; Shertzer and Walsh 2019). A similar response in the
recent suburban setting would have caused neighborhood racial and economic characteristics to
quickly change, potentially wiping out the gains made by Black households that suburbanized to
initially higher-SES neighborhoods. In this subsection, we use two exercises to assess the response
of White households and other suburban incumbents to an increase in Black population.
Our first exercise is motivated by Schelling (1971)’s canonical work on tipping points and Card,
Mas and Rothstein (2008)’s attempt to empirically estimate tipping points in neighborhood racial
composition. The latter paper finds important thresholds when a neighborhood reaches 5–20%
non-White, with the exact number depending on the region. To see if this racial tipping occurs in
our setting, we simply plot the evolution of population by race for the set of suburban tracts that
were near this tipping range in 1980. We focus on neighborhoods that were 10–30 percent Black,
conservatively raising the threshold value from the literature.13 Results are shown in Figure 4.
Panel A shows the results when including all such tracts in our 40 large CBSAs. Mean White
population stays nearly constant through the end of the sample period, while strong Black and
Hispanic growth drive a roughly 70 percent increase in total population. The rapid overall growth
immediately points to a difference from earlier settings where strong White flight occurred—many
of these suburban areas were not fully built out in 1980, leaving room to add housing units and
people. This may matter in both mechanical and behavioral ways. Mechanically, it means that a
Black household can arrive without another household vacating a house. In addition, White house-
13We use 1980 as the starting point for this exercise because few suburban tracts fell in this range in 1970.
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holds in newly built or rapidly growing places may actually have different behavioral responses to
Black arrivals, perhaps because neighborhood racial identity is less established.
In Panel B, we examine the moderating role of housing supply elasticity by repeating the graph
in Panel A but including only tracts with population over 3,000 in 1980 (approximately the median
in the sample). These tracts were more built out, making it more difficult to add large numbers
of housing units. The story indeed looks somewhat different—mean White population declines
from 3,000 to 2,100, and total population only increases by about 15 percent. However, we do
not see the type of neighborhood flipping that characterized White flight after World War II; each
new non-White household is associated with a loss of less than one White household. Both panels
suggest that the response to Black arrivals in the suburbs may be small relative to previous periods
and contexts, which is especially notable because the time series spans more than 35 years, a long
enough period to allow even slow-moving flight to occur.
In our second exercise, we examine the flight response more systematically by replicating
Boustan (2010)’s main specification in our setting. Boustan studies the White response to Black
population increases in central cities between 1940 and 1970 and finds that one Black arrival led to
2.7 White departures. We replace central cities with the set of suburban tracts that were over 90%
White in 1970.14 The most direct analogue of Boustan’s specification is
white_submrt = αm + β1black_submrt + γ1cbsa_popmrt + νrt + εmrt, (1)
where m indexes metropolitan areas, r indexes northern or southern states, t indexes time, and,
for example, white_sub is the White population in our suburban tracts of interest. However, the
exercise is complicated by the rapid growth of the Hispanic population in our sample period. This
may moderate the effect of Black population changes on White population, and changes in His-
panic population could also independently drive changes in both Black and White population. We
use three different versions of the specification that account for Hispanic growth in different ways.
14We focus on this set of tracts because most suburbs were mostly White at the outset of the sample period. We also
restrict to tracts with population over 1,000 in 1970 because an existing population is necessary for a flight response.
The results are not very sensitive to either of these choices.
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First, we replace Black population with minority (Hispanic and Black) population on the right-
hand side. Second, we replace White population with non-Black population on the left-hand side.
Third, we keep Black population on the right-hand side and White population as the dependent
variable, but we also add a control for Hispanic population in the tracts of interest.
In addition to the differential importance of Hispanics, we also cannot directly apply Bous-
tan’s instrumental variable strategy. We instead use a coefficient stability approach to assess the
potential role of unobserved variables in our OLS estimates. We first estimate the simple speci-
fication with no controls, then add controls for 10-year lags of Black percent, Hispanic percent,
median household income, poverty rate, owner-occupancy rate, and vacancy rate. We then use the
approach outlined in Oster (2019) to roughly estimate what the differences in coefficients and R2
between the controlled and uncontrolled regressions imply about omitted variable bias.
Results are shown in Table 2. Column 1 shows the OLS estimates without control variables, and
the different panels contain the different combinations of dependent and right-hand-side variables.
The coefficient of interest ranges from −0.3 to −0.8, implying that a unit increase in Black (or
minority) population is associated with less than a one unit decrease in White (or non-Black)
population. This is substantially smaller than Boustan’s baseline OLS estimate of −2.1, which lies
outside the 95 percent confidence interval of all of our estimates. However, Boustan’s estimate
grows to −2.7 when using an instrumental variable that accounts for endogeneity in the Black
arrivals rate, suggesting that our OLS estimates could also be biased toward zero.
Column 2 shows results with the added control variables. The estimates shrink toward zero
in all specifications. Under the typical coefficient stability argument that the remaining omitted
variables have a similar relationship to the dependent and right-hand side variables, this suggests
the OLS results are biased away from zero, rather than toward it. To further investigate what the
change in coefficients and R2 imply about the magnitude of the bias, we employ techniques from
Oster (2019).
The Oster estimator requires assumptions on the relative degree of selection on unobserved
and unobserved variables and on the R2 that would result from a hypothetical regression of the
14
outcome on treatment and both the observed and unobserved control variables (denoted Rmax).
We implement two versions of the restricted estimator from Oster (2019).15 In both, we assume
that selection on observed and unobserved variables is equal. In column 3, we assume that the
Rmax is equal to the controlled R2 plus the difference between the controlled and uncontrolled
R2. That is, adding the omitted variables would increase R2 by the same amount as adding the
observed control variables did. This shifts the estimate for the White/minority specification (the
largest OLS estimate) from −0.78 to −0.76. In column 4, we instead assume that Rmax is equal
to the controlled R2 plus three times the difference between the controlled and uncontrolled R2.
The resulting estimate for White/minority falls to −0.72. Although coefficient stability approaches
have limitations, these results provide evidence that our OLS estimates do not suffer from a large
bias toward zero.
Both exercises in this section suggest that the suburban response to Black arrivals is muted
relative to the White response to Black arrivals in cities during earlier time periods, helping to
explain how Black suburbanization has led to gains in neighborhood quality. The difference could
occur because the suburbs were generally a growing area during this time period, because racial
attitudes have changed, or because Black arrivals to the suburbs were of a higher social class than
the earlier arrivals from the rural South. This final point is particularly important because it means
that our estimates may not reflect the response to policies that help low-income Black households
move to the suburbs.
2.2.2 Selective migration
Next, we use microdata to examine Black households’ suburbanization decisions, studying both
selection into suburbanization and choice of suburban neighborhood. Because the available data
on migration is more limited than tract characteristics, our exercises here use more limited samples
15The restricted estimator requires more assumptions than the primary estimator in Oster (2019), but it offers two
benefits. First, it yields unique solutions that lie relatively close to the estimates from the controlled regression.
In contrast, the full estimator frequently requires choosing one of multiple solutions, some of which are orders of
magnitude different than the controlled solution. Second, it has a transparent and easily interpreted formula. Because
coefficient stability approaches fundamentally rely on several unverifiable assumptions, these benefits outweigh the
costs of the additional assumptions.
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including fewer years and metro areas than the remainder of the paper.
First, Black suburbanizers appear to be positively selected from cities. In Appendix Figure
A10, we plot the distributions of household income for Black households that suburbanized (de-
fined as moving from a central city to its suburbs) in the five years prior to the 1980 or 1990 cen-
suses versus those who remained in cities over the same period.16 The suburbanizer distribution is
well to the right, with a median income for this group if $38,000 (in 2018 dollars) versus $23,000
for city dwellers. This shows one channel that contributed to the divergence in neighborhood
outcomes—higher-income households, which can afford high-SES neighborhoods, disproportion-
ately moved to the suburbs. (This channel also contributes to the increased income segregation
discussed in the next section.)
Second, Black suburbanizers may selectively migrate to areas with higher SES than their origin.
The Infutor data allow us to assess this by comparing the origin and destination tracts of movers;
however, it does not identify race. This limits related exercises in an important way—we can
only identify likely Black suburbanizers as those who moved out of city neighborhoods that were
nearly all Black. This group may follow different patterns than, for example, Black households
that suburbanized from predominantly White city tracts. With that caveat in mind, we restrict to
suburbanizers from city tracts that were over 80 percent Black in 2010 and compare characteristics
of their origin and destination neighborhoods.17 In addition, because the Infutor data have a more
limited time period than historical census data, we consider only moves between 2010 and 2016.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows the relationship between median household incomes in the desti-
nation and origin tracts. In general, suburbanizers from these areas took a large step up in neigh-
borhood income. At the average origin income of approximately $30,000, roughly 75 percent of
suburbanizers saw an increase over $20,000. The average college share (Panel C) follows a similar
pattern, and Panel B shows that migrants also typically move to tracts with higher median hous-
16As noted in Section 1.1, we can only uniquely identify migrants from a city to its suburbs in a subsample of metro
areas. More details are provided in Appendix I.
17City tracts that meet this criteria are 93 percent Black on average. They contain 45 percent of the city Black
population in our sample, and they are a particularly interesting set of neighborhoods because they saw the fastest
Black population decline during our sample period.
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ing costs. While the median cost may misrepresent the availability of very cheap units, Panel D
shows that suburbanizers also generally move to neighborhoods where a substantially lower share
of two-bedroom apartments have gross rent under $1,000.
These graphs show that suburbanizers from majority-Black neighborhoods are typically pay-
ing a higher housing cost to move to a higher income area with higher rates of college education.
While there are some caveats—notably that tract median housing cost may differ from the cost
suburbanizers actually pay—this suggests that, on average, they prefer the amenity bundle pro-
vided by suburban neighborhoods and are moving to access it. Combined with the evidence that
suburbanizers are positively selected from cities, these results help explain how the city-suburb
divergence in neighborhood characterstics occurred: out-migrants both move to places with higher
SES than their origins and are higher income themselves.
2.2.3 Drivers of increased suburban share
The changing share of Black households living in suburbs (which are higher SES on average) has
also affected average neighborhood characteristics for Black households. While we do not attempt
to precisely decompose the many factors that may have contributed to this trend over a 50-year time
period, past literature points to several. Perhaps most important, the Fair Housing Act was passed
in 1968, and some forms of housing discrimination in the suburbs have subsequently declined
(Bostic and Martin 2005; Turner et al. 2013).18 In addition, job suburbanization (Miller 2020;
Baum-Snow and Hartley 2020) and changing relative amenities in cities and suburbs (Baum-Snow
and Lutz 2011; Baum-Snow and Hartley 2020) could influence Black suburbanization decisions.
Finally, the growth of the Black middle class has likely contributed to the rise in Black subur-
banization (Landry and Marsh 2011; Frey 2015; Bayer and Charles 2018). To assess the impor-
tance of this channel, we use a simple decomposition of the relative importance of changing Black
incomes and changing suburban share within income bins. Results are shown in Appendix Fig-
ure A11. While both factors matter, changes in the suburban share conditional on income explain
18Note that other research illustrates that housing discrimination has certainly not been eliminated. See, for example,
Christensen and Timmins (2018).
17
about 70 percent of the total. This suggests that income growth contributes to the trend but is not
the dominant factor. Instead, factors that increase the suburban share conditional on income, such
as changes in housing discrimination or relative amenities in cities and suburbs, must also play a
large role.
3 Income Stratification
In 1970, income segregation within Black households was lower than among the overall pop-
ulation. However, it has since risen rapidly and now scores about 50 percent higher on common
segregation indices than the nation as a whole (Bischoff and Reardon 2014). This trend is of partic-
ular interest due to Wilson (1987)’s influential hypothesis that increasing Black class stratification
could have a variety of negative effects on high-poverty, majority-Black city neighborhoods. In
this section, we show that increased Black income segregation has largely occurred through sub-
urbanization and changes in the suburbs. We also show that similar patterns appear for related
statistics on income integration that have been highlighted by past literature.
Strong and growing income sorting between Black households in cities and suburbs is imme-
diately apparent in the raw data. The mean household income in our sample was similar in the
two areas in 1970: $50,000 in suburbs versus $49,000 in cities. However, in 2016, the figure had
risen to $72,000 in suburbs versus only $54,000 in cities (Appendix Figure A12). Unsurprisingly,
indices of Black income segregation at the tract level have increased sharply over the same time pe-
riod. The time series of the segregation index developed in Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004), shown
in the upper line of Figure 6, has increased from 0.1 in 1970 to 0.18 in 2016. (This metric can be
interpreted as the share of total income variation that is between census tracts.) In the lower line on
the figure, we freeze segregation within the suburbs and between cities and suburbs at 1970 levels
and recompute the aggregate index in each year. The frozen suburbanization index rises by only
about a quarter of the increase in the actual index, suggesting that changes in income segregation
within cities have played a relatively small role in the overall trend.19 In Appendix II.A, we show
19Farley (1970) describes several examples of majority-Black suburban enclaves that developed prior to World War
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that this trend also occurs within each census region.
The same general pattern is visible in a number of measures that are easier to interpret than
an aggregate index. For example, previous literature has noted that Black households tend to live
in neighborhoods with lower median income than the neighborhoods of White households with
a similar income (Bayer, Fang and McMillan 2014, Reardon, Fox and Townsend 2015). Figure
7 shows how this relationship has evolved differently for Black households in cities and suburbs.
For the suburbs, shown in the left panel, we see that the correlation between household and neigh-
borhood income has increased substantially. High-income Black households in the suburbs now
live in much higher income neighborhoods than they did in 1970. For cities, in the right panel,
the change has been much smaller. Another metric of income stratification is the rate at which
high-income households share neighborhoods with households in poverty. Appendix Figure A13
shows the share of Black households earning over $100,000 (in 2018 dollars) who live in a tract
with over 20 percent poverty. In central cities, this percentage has remained constant at about 40,
while it has fallen from 22 percent to 10 percent for high earners in the suburbs. This has led the
overall average to decline from 30 percent to 20 percent, with all of the improvements arising from
the combination of decreasing suburban poverty exposure and an increasing suburban share. For
both of these alternative measures, most of the changes have occurred outside of central cities.
A factor that may be both a cause and consequence of this pattern is the growth of high-SES,
majority Black neighborhoods in the suburbs. These areas have received scholarly attention be-
cause they are both attractive to many high-SES Black households and historically scarce (Lacy
2007; Bayer, Fang and McMillan 2014; Lacy 2016; Aliprantis, Carroll and Young 2019). This
scarcity has been used to explain why Black households tend to live in lower-SES neighborhoods
than White households with equivalent characteristics—they may have to accept lower neighbor-
hood SES in order to live in an area with a substantial Black population. In Figure 8, we show that
the number of majority-Black tracts in our sample with median income above the sample median
II. These areas largely suffered from the same discrimination and segregation as majority-Black neighborhoods in
cities. This helps explain why city and suburban mean Black incomes were similar in 1970, as well as why the arrival
of higher income Black households increased income integration within the suburbs.
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has risen from under 200 in 1970 to over 500 in 2016. However, again, the trend is nearly entirely
driven by increases in the suburbs, where the number of such tracts grew from 20 in 1970 to 300
today. Meanwhile, the number of high-income, majority-Black tracts in cities has remained the
same since 1980. Panel B shows a similar pattern for high-education majority-Black tracts.20
These findings suggest that municipal borders play an important role in the growing class strat-
ification within Black households. The nature of that role, however, is an open question. One
potential explanation comes from prior sociological research that suggests that high-SES Black
neighborhoods struggle to maintain separation from lower-income Black households, leading in-
dicators like neighborhood income to gradually decline (Pattillo-McCoy 2000). Suburbs may be
distinct from cities in ways that help preserve this separation. For example, suburbs generally
require a car in order to get around easily, and they also have relatively large shares of owner-
occupied housing. These factors could create financial barriers that prevent the in-migration of
lower-income households.
4 Black Population Decline in Central Cities
While many Black households have achieved significant gains through suburbanization, those in
cities have instead seen neighborhood SES and population decline. The neighborhood income of
the average Black city dweller has fallen relative to the sample average, and census tracts that were
high poverty and majority Black in 1970 have since lost over 60 percent of Black and 40 percent
In this section, we explore Black population decline in central cities in detail. We focus on
population decline because it is at the root of many amenity changes—large losses in a neighbor-
hood can have negative effects ranging from school closures to reduced retail options to declining
support for local institutions such as churches or block clubs. In addition, studying the population
mechanics sheds light on the determinants of Black suburbanization. We first use a detailed anal-
ysis of heterogeneity across neighborhoods to distinguish the roles of gentrification and declining
20Similar results emerge when we stratify on whether a tract was majority Black in 1970, as shown in Appendix
Figure A14. Whether in cities or suburbs, growth in high-SES majority-Black neighborhoods has generally been in
neighborhoods that were not majority Black at the start of the sample period.
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amenities or quality of life. Second, we use a simple demographic projection model to separate the
contribution of changing fertility and death rates and the net migration of different age groups.
4.1 Decline in gentrified versus high-poverty neighborhoods
A self-reinforcing cycle of decline and disinvestment could be responsible for the large population
losses in tracts that were high poverty and majority Black in 1970. Some residents move away due
to low quality of life, and this further reduces quality of life and outside investment, generating
further population loss. Alternatively, gentrification, which has increased greatly over the same
time period that Black city population has declined, could reduce Black population in affected
neighborhoods (Baum-Snow and Hartley 2020).
To assess the relative importance of these two stories, we tabulate Black population decline in
our sample by 2016 tract characteristics. If gentrification is the dominant factor, we would expect
to see that most decline has occurred in areas that now have low poverty rates and a relatively
large White population. Alternatively, we may see that decline has been concentrated in areas that
remain high poverty and majority Black today. The latter appears to be the case, as shown in Table
3. In Panel A, we see that central city tracts with 2016 poverty rates over 20 percent have lost
one million Black people since 2000, while low-poverty tracts lost only 80,000. Panel B show that
tracts that were both high poverty and majority Black in 2016 lost 830,000 Black people over the
same time period. In contrast, majority-Black tracts that are not high poverty lost only 60,000,
while all other city tracts (i.e., tracts that are not majority Black) lost 220,000.
These broad tract categories are useful because they capture many possible definitions of gen-
trification. However, there are also drawbacks. For example, it is possible that the total population
change in areas that were high income in 2016 disguises opposite trends in tracts that were always
high income and those that gentrified. In Appendix Table A3, we tabulate Black population in
each year for census tracts that did and did not gentrify between 1970 and 2016. We say that a tract
gentrified if its median income was below the CBSA median in 1970 and above it in 2016. We ad-
ditionally separate “superstar” cities (Boston, Los Angeles, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco)
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from others.
During the 2000–2016 time period when total Black city population in our sample fell, all
gentrification categories saw declines. However, about 85 percent of the aggregate decline occurred
in tracts that did not gentrify. This result does not occur because gentrified neighborhoods lost a
smaller percentage of their Black population—the relative change was about 11 percent in both
sets of tracts. Instead, the much lower baseline Black population in tracts that gentrified leads
equal percent changes to have very different implications for the aggregate total. Interestingly,
the lowest percentage decrease (−5 percent) was in non-superstar city tracts that gentrified, while
the highest decrease (−21 percent) was in gentrified tracts in superstar cities. This may occur
because amenity improvements help attract or retain Black households as long as they are not
paired with too large of an increase in housing costs. Together, these results suggest that while
gentrification can have large effects within a neighborhood and tends to be salient when it occurs,
it is not common enough, at least in neighborhoods with a large initial Black population, to have a
large effect at the aggregate level. Instead, it appears that the lion’s share of decline occurs in areas
with low SES, pointing to the importance of low or declining amenities.
4.2 Differences across age groups and the role of demographic trends
While our focus in this study is suburbanization and migration more broadly, demographic trends
could also contribute to Black city population decline. To assess their importance, we now analyze
heterogeneity across age groups and do some simple demographic projections. Table 4 contains
the time series of Black population by age group for cities and suburbs in our sample. Panel A
shows that the number of Black children in central cities has fallen by a remarkable 30 percent
since 2000. The number of young adults (18–34) has fallen by 8 percent, and 35–64-year-olds
have decreased by 5 percent. In contrast, the number of Black people over age 65 has increased
by nearly 20 percent in cities. These figures are influenced by national demographic trends, as the
total number of Black children in the United States decreased slightly over the same period and
the Black over-65 population grew quickly. However, Panel C shows that the city share of the
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sample total has changed differentially across age buckets, with its share of children falling from
64 percent to 33 percent and its share of senior citizens falling only from 66 percent to 40 percent.
These results suggest that households with children play a disproportionate role in the recent
decline, a fact that has not, to our knowledge, been documented in prior literature. This may result
from preferences over city and suburban amenities that vary with age and household status, leading
different groups to respond differently to changes in the two areas (Boustan and Shertzer 2013;
Albouy and Faberman 2019). Alternatively, the baseline age distribution of the Black population
in cities may not have been at steady state in 1970, leading to changes over time even without any
changes in preferences or amenities. Appendix Figure A15 shows that the Black city population
was indeed disproportionately young in 1970, which was approximately the conclusion of the
Great Migration. Moreover, this demographic story may also help explain the decline in total
population, as a changing age distribution will lead the natural growth rate of the population to
change over time.
Motivated by this evidence, we assess the importance of migration and changing natural growth
rates using a simple and mechanical demographic model. We start with the central city Black age
distribution in a given decade, say, 1970. We then simulate what the Black age distribution in
1980 would have been if there were no in- or out-migration. To do so, we mechanically age
the population in each age bin and assume that people die and give birth at the average rate for
that decade. (Note that fertility rates also fell over the sample period.) The exercise bears some
similarities to Boustan and Shertzer (2013) but uses an accounting model rather than a regression-
based approach.
This simulation allows us to compute two interesting objects. First, the implied natural growth
rate (e.g., simulated population in 1980 − actual population in 1970) gives a sense of the demo-
graphic tailwind driven by the baseline age distribution at different points in time. Second, the
observed shortfall (e.g., simulated population in 1980 − observed population in 1980) provides a
measure of net migration, reflecting the relative attractiveness of cities. These objects can also be
computed separately for different age groups and races.
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Figure 9, Panel A plots actual growth, natural growth, and shortfall for total Black population
in cities in each decade, all normalized by population at the beginning of the decade. Actual growth
has fallen from 9 percent in the 1970s to −5 percent today, first turning negative in the 2000s, and
natural growth has trended steadily downward, from 12 percent to 7 percent now. This decline
in natural growth accounts for about a third of the observed population change, illustrating that a
changing age structure and falling fertility are important factors in ongoing trends in Black city
population. Of course, since our simulation uses the observed population distribution in each base
period, age-selective migration in one period will also impact natural growth rates in the next.
The migration shortfall has also increased, accounting for the remainder of the decline. It
hovered at −5 percent between 1980 and 2000 before falling to roughly −12 percent. This change
has not been evenly distributed across age groups, as shown in Panel B of Figure 9. For people
over age 35, the shortfall has remained steady at about −15 percent. This may reflect a general
tendency to suburbanize after having children or increasing income over the life cycle. However,
for people under 35, it fell from roughly 0 between 1980 and 2000 to −10 percent in the most
recent decades. This suggests that the changing decisions of young people have played a key
role in the decline. Early in the sample period, cities performed relatively well with young Black
households, perhaps due to good employment opportunities, cheap housing options, or appealing
amenities. This has since changed. The increasing shortfall among young Black people is not
only different from earlier time periods, it is also significantly different than what we see from
White and Hispanic populations today, as shown in Appendix Figure A16. All groups have a
significant shortfall among people over age 35, but White and Hispanic populations have recently
outperformed projected growth in the young population.
Studying differences across age groups and demographic trends improves our understanding of
central city Black population decline in two main ways. First, trends have differed greatly across
age groups, with young households and those with children playing a pivotal role in the decline.
While not as salient as a long-time resident moving away from a neighborhood, a 25-year-old
deciding not to move to that neighborhood has the same impact on its population. Second, both
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forces identified above—the aging of the disproportionately young Black city population at the end
of the Great Migration and the changing choices of different age groups—help drive the observed
patterns.
5 Conclusion
We provide the first economic analysis of Black suburbanization. We show that high-income Black
households are increasingly locating in suburban neighborhoods with relatively high SES. These
suburbanizers have largely retained their gains in neighborhood quality in part because the White
flight in response to their arrival is muted relative to earlier time periods. In cities, majority-Black
neighborhoods have been unable to compensate for these departures because of both low net mi-
gration and slowing natural growth rates. This leads these areas to see declines in population as
well as, because Black suburbanizers are positively selected, decreases in average neighborhood
income. Together, these trends are leading to a divergence, with higher-income Black suburbanites
increasingly living in more integrated neighborhoods with higher-quality indicators and lower-
income Black city dwellers seeing their neighborhood characteristics stagnate or worsen. We
believe our paper is the first to document these patterns in detail and explore their drivers and
implications.
Our results illustrate an important feature of the evolution of urban geography and racial in-
equality in America—uneven progress. Similar patterns appear in the labor market: Bayer and
Charles (2018) show that the racial wage gap has closed more quickly at higher quantiles of the
distribution. More broadly, Wilson (1987) famously observed that reductions in discrimination
and affirmative action programs could disproportionately benefit the Black middle class, enabling
them to separate from low-income Black households in a variety of ways.
While we have taken a descriptive approach with the goal of laying out new stylized facts and
identifying their candidate drivers in the spirit of Gelman and Imbens (2013), our findings lay the
groundwork for a number of causal research questions. First, what role do municipal borders play
in driving these changes? For example, do car dependence and owner-occupied housing help pre-
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serve class sorting across municipalities? Second, how will the reallocation toward the suburbs
affect the economic and social outcomes of Black individuals? Third, how have reduced hous-
ing discrimination and inadequate provision of public services in majority-Black neighborhoods
affected Black migration patterns? Finally, what are the political implications of changing racial
compositions of electoral districts?
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Change in Black Residential Locations Since 1970
Panel A: Share of Black Population
Panel B: Total Black Population
Notes: Total and share of Black population in large central cities, their suburbs, and other areas. Largest 40 cities
is defined as the central cities of the most populous 20 CBSAs in southern states and in all other states, as measured
in 1970. Suburbs are defined as the CBSAs containing these cities, less the principal city itself. Municipalities and
CBSAs are consistently defined according to 2010 boundaries. We assign areas that had not been assigned to a census
tract in 1970 or 1980 to the other areas category, inferring their population from the national Black population. The 40
central cities are Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Birmingham, AL; Boston, MA; Buffalo, NY; Charleston, SC; Charlotte,
NC; Chicago, IL; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, OH; Dallas, TX; Detroit, MI; El Paso, TX; Greensboro, NC; Houston,
TX; Jacksonville, FL; Kansas City, KS; Kansas City, MO; Knoxville, TN; Los Angeles, CA; Memphis, TN; Miami,
FL; Milwaukee, WI; Minneapolis, MN; Nashville-Davidson, TN; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; Oakland, CA;
Orlando, FL; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; Providence, RI; Richmond, VA; San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA;
San Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA; St. Louis, MO; St. Paul, MN; Tampa, FL; Virginia Beach, VA; Washington, DC;
Winston-Salem, NC.
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Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Black Population in Los Angeles Metro Area
Panel A: Census Tract Black Population in 1970
Panel B: Census Tract Black Population in 2016
Notes: Total Black population by census tract in the Los Angeles CBSA in 1970 (Panel A) and 2016 (Panel B). Tracts
with 0–40 Black individuals are shown in dark blue; 40–200, light blue; 200–1,000, beige; 1,000–2,000, orange; and
2,000–10,000, red. Data are drawn from the 1970 census and the 2014–2018 ACS. Census tract boundaries are from
2010. Black lines represent county boundaries. Similar maps for Chicago, Houston, and New York City are in
Appendix Figures A3, A4, and A5.
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Figure 3: Neighborhood Income for Black Individuals Relative to White Individuals
Notes: This figure plots the time series of average neighborhood median household income for Black individuals
divided by the same statistic for White individuals. The blue line contains Black individuals in all tracts in our sample,
while the green and red lines include only Black individuals in the suburbs and cities, respectively. In all cases,
neighborhood income among White individuals (the denominator) includes all tracts in the sample. Census tract
income data come from the 1970 to 2000 decennial censuses and the 2008–2012 and 2014–2018 ACS. The exercise
uses our primary sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure 4: Population by Race in Suburban Neighborhoods in Tipping Range in 1980
Panel A: All Tracts in Tipping Range
Panel B: Restricting to Tracts with 1980 Population Over 3,000
Notes: Time series of population by race for suburban tracts that were between 10 and 30 percent Black in 1980.
The top panel includes all such tracts, while the bottom restricts to tracts that had population over 3,000 in 1980. This
restriction helps to identify areas that were more built up in 1980 and likely had lower housing supply elasticity. The
exercise includes our primary sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure 5: Comparing Origin and Destination Neighborhoods of Suburbanizers from Highly Black
Areas
Panel A: Median Household Income Panel B: Median Housing Costs
Panel C: Percent College Panel D: Percent of 2BR < $1000
Notes: This figure shows the difference in neighborhood characteristics (destination minus origin) for people who
suburbanized from city tracts that were over 80 percent Black, conditional on the median income of the origin tract.
The blue line represents the median value of the difference, while the red and green are, respectively, the 75th and 25th
quantiles. The sample includes only moves to the suburbs of the origin city during the years 2010-2016. Migration
data is from Infutor Data Solutions, and tract characteristics are drawn from the 2008–2012 ACS. Median housing
costs includes gross rent for renters and gross ownership costs for homeowners, and percent college is defined as the
share of people over age 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree. Panel D provides a measure of the availability of low-cost
housing—the percent of two-bedroom rental units with gross rent below $1,000. The exercise includes our primary
sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure 6: Change in Income Segregation Within Black Households
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) income segregation index within
Black households from 1970 to 2016. The index can be interpreted as the share of the variation in household income
that is between census tracts. The blue line shows the actual evolution of this index, while the red line shows the
evolution under the counterfactual assumption that the share of Black households living in the suburbs and the income
segregation of Black households in suburban tracts both remained frozen at their 1970 values. The index is computed
using Census and ACS data on the distribution of Black households across income bins within census tracts, as detailed
in Appendix I. The exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure 7: Black Household Income versus Neighborhood Income
Notes: Evolution of the relationship between Black households’ income and their neighborhood’s median income.
Each line shows the relationship in a different year, with median neighborhood income on the y-axis and household
income on the x-axis. The left panel represents suburban households, while the right contains those in central cities.
Household income is inflation-adjusted and set at the midpoint of each income bin provided by the Census Bureau in
a given year. The exception is income bins with a lower limit exceeding $175,000, for which we set household income
to $175,000 in order to remove top-coding differences across years. The exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large
cities and their suburbs.
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Figure 8: Growth in Majority-Black Neighborhoods with High Levels of Income and Education
Panel A: Median Income Above Sample Median
Panel B: College Share Above Sample Median
Notes: This figure shows the number of census tracts that are majority Black and either high income (Panel A) or high
education (Panel B). High-income is defined as having tract median income above the median value in the sample, and
high-education is defined analogously for share of residents over age 25 that have at least a bachelor’s degree. In both
panels, the light gray area represents the number of tracts that fit the definition in central cities, while the dark gray
shows the total number of tracts that fit the given definition. The exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large cities
and their suburbs.
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Figure 9: Predicted Natural Growth and Realized Shortfall of Black Central City Population
Panel A: Overall Natural Growth and Realized Shortfall
Panel B: Realized Shortfall Separated by Age Group
Notes: Panel A compares the predicted natural growth rate in the Black population in central cities to the ob-
served growth rate. Panel B plots the realized shortfall (the difference between predicted natural growth and ob-
served growth) separately for people over and under age 35. As described in detail in Section 4, predicted popula-
tion growth rates for year t are constructed by taking the true population age distribution in time t − 10, mechani-
cally aging the population in each five-year age bin, assuming people die and give birth at the average rate for that
decade, and assuming that net-migration is zero for each age group. The predicted population growth rate is then:
(popsimulated,t − popobserved,t-10)/(popobserved,t-10). Census data on Black population in age bins are standardized follow-
ing the procedures described in Appendix I. Race-age specific fertility rates in each year are taken from the Census
Bureau, and age-specific mortality rates come from the Centers for Disease Control. The exercise uses the 40 large
central cities in our primary sample.
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1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016
Panel A: Black population
City Other Low 1.01 2.97 4.06 5.22 5.27 5.19
City Other High 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.72
City Black Low 2.45 2.42 2.18 2.04 1.73 1.65
City Black High 5.03 3.87 3.18 2.69 2.20 2.03
Suburb Other Low 1.52 3.53 5.59 8.70 11.88 12.41
Suburb Other High 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.44 0.58 0.62
Suburb Black Low 0.64 0.67 0.62 0.58 0.51 0.48
Suburb Black High 1.03 0.94 0.83 0.76 0.71 0.67
Panel B: Total population
City Other Low 22.6 22.8 24.2 26.3 26.6 27.9
City Other High 3.85 3.22 3.36 3.53 3.72 3.91
City Black Low 3.02 2.69 2.48 2.38 2.20 2.27
City Black High 5.93 4.43 3.91 3.64 3.50 3.66
Suburb Other Low 52.6 64.0 76.0 88.1 98.1 103.5
Suburb Other High 1.71 2.03 2.56 3.25 4.19 4.69
Suburb Black Low 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.87
Suburb Black High 1.32 1.20 1.15 1.19 1.29 1.37
Notes: This table reports the evolution of Black and total population in different types of neighborhoods. Panel A
shows Black population, and Panel B shows total population (both in millions). High-poverty is defined as above 20
percent. Neighborhoods are categorized according to their 1970 characteristics. The exercise uses our primary sample
of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Table 2: Suburban Population Response to Increased Black Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS w/controls Oster 1x Oster 3x
Panel A: DV=White pop.
Minority population -0.802 -0.780 -0.759 -0.716
(S.E.) (0.239) (0.250)




Panel B: DV=non-Black pop.
Black population -0.296 -0.025 0.246 0.789
(S.E.) (0.336) (0.436)




Panel C: DV=White pop.
Black population -0.390 -0.261 -0.131 0.128
(S.E.) (0.264) (0.384)
MSA population 0.059 0.063
(S.E.) (0.046) (0.045)




Notes: This table examines the population response to increased Black or minority populations in suburban census
tracts that were over 90% White in 1970. Panel A considers the White population response to increased minority
(Black and Hispanic) population, and Panel B shows the non-Black response to increased Black population. Finally,
Panel C considers the White response to increased Black population, controlling for Hispanic population. Within a
panel, Column 1 simply estimates Equation 1 using OLS. Column 2 adds controls for ten-year lags of Black percent,
Hispanic percent, median household income, poverty rate, owner-occupancy rate, and vacancy rate. Columns 3 and 4
employ the restricted estimator from Oster (2019). The Oster 1x specification assumes that adding the unobservable
controls to the regression would increase the R2 by the same amount as did adding the observed controls, while the
Oster 3x specification assumes that this would increase the R2 by three times that amount. One CBSA (El Paso, TX)
did not have any suburban tracts that were over 90% White in 1970 and is not included in the sample.
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Table 3: Black Population (in millions) in Central City Tracts Stratified by 2016 Characteristics
Tract Type 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016
Panel A:
High poverty 7.06 7.36 7.20 7.25 6.46 6.17
Low poverty 2.14 2.63 2.96 3.49 3.49 3.42
Panel B:
Majority Black, high poverty 5.38 5.59 5.31 5.20 4.52 4.34
Majority Black, low poverty 1.07 1.40 1.52 1.74 1.67 1.68
Not majority Black 2.75 3.00 3.34 3.80 3.77 3.57
Panel C:
Majority Black 6.45 6.99 6.82 6.94 6.19 6.02
Majority White 0.63 0.68 0.76 0.93 0.97 0.91
Majority Hispanic 1.08 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.00 0.92
All other racial compositions 1.05 1.22 1.45 1.75 1.80 1.74
Notes: This table reports the time series of Black population in central city neighborhoods stratified by their 2016
characteristics. Panel A separates tracts that are high- and low-poverty, with high-poverty defined as over 20%. Panel
B separates tracts into three categories—majority Black and high poverty, majority Black and low poverty, and all
other tracts. Finally, Panel C separates tracts according to their racial majority. The 40 central cities in our primary
sample are included.
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Table 4: Black Population in Cities and Suburbs by Age Group
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016
Panel A: City total (millions)
Age 0-17 3.52 3.19 2.96 3.16 2.47 2.17
Age 18-34 2.33 3.08 3.02 2.71 2.53 2.52
Age 35-64 2.57 2.74 3.07 3.68 3.73 3.53
Age 65- 0.57 0.77 0.94 1.02 1.05 1.21
Panel B: Suburb total (millions)
Age 0-17 1.97 2.89 3.38 4.55 5.38 4.45
Age 18-34 1.20 2.70 3.36 3.96 5.13 4.77
Age 35-64 1.28 2.09 3.09 5.03 7.33 6.84
Age 65- 0.29 0.54 0.76 1.02 1.52 1.81
Panel C: City share (percent)
Age 0-17 0.64 0.52 0.47 0.41 0.31 0.33
Age 18-34 0.66 0.53 0.47 0.41 0.33 0.35
Age 35-64 0.67 0.57 0.50 0.42 0.34 0.34
Age 65- 0.66 0.59 0.55 0.50 0.41 0.40
Notes: This table reports the time series of Black population in central cities and suburbs by age groups. Panel A
reports central city totals; Panel B is suburb totals, and Panel C is the city share of metropolitan total. The procedure
used to standardize the age bins available in each year are described in Appendix I. This exercise uses our primary
sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Appendices
This appendix contain further details about the exercises in main text. Section I contains more
information about data sources and variable construction. Section II.A discusses how the main
results are similar or different across different regions of the United States. Section II.B contains
the additional figures and tables that are referenced in the main text.
I Data Preparation
I.A Panel of Census Tract Characteristics
We combine three main sources to produce the tract panel data used in most of our analysis. The
first is the Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB),21 which provides tract characteristics for the
years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, mapped to consistent 2010 tract boundaries (Logan,
Xu and Stults 2014). The first four years of characteristics are taken from decennial censuses,
while 2010 is drawn from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey (ACS). Second, IPUMS
provides additional tract variables for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2016 (Manson
et al. 2017). For the IPUMS data, the first five years are taken from decennial censuses, while 2016
is drawn from the 2014-2018 ACS. Finally, the third source is Census and American Community
Survey (ACS) microdata for each of these years, again compiled by IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2020).
The 1970-2010 LTDB forms the base of our panel, which we supplement with additional char-
acteristics from IPUMS and the 2014-2018 ACS. To map the additional characteristics to consistent
2010 tract boundaries, we use the set of crosswalks provided in the LTDB. Finally, we impute some
variables by combining the LTDB and the Census/ACS microdata. We do this when a variable of
interest is not included in any of the datasets, but a similar variable is. For example, we may want
the number of US-born non-Hispanic Black people who live in a census tract, but find that IPUMS
contains only counts for non-Hispanic Black or US-born Black. This issue most frequently arises
21This can be accessed at http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Researcher/Bridging.htm.
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due to early censuses not distinguishing between Hispanic and non-Hispanic.
In these cases, we estimate the variable of interest by adjusting the available tract data using
information from the microdata. Returning to the above example, we would use the microdata
to calculate the share of non-Hispanic Black who were born in the US in the tract’s city, then
multiply the non-Hispanic Black count in the tract by this value. In the event that the microdata do
not provide the necessary information at the city level, we calculate it at the county level. If it is
not provided at the county level, we move to the CBSA level.
The following is a summary of the variables in our dataset and how they are constructed.
Population by race.— We draw the population of each race from the LTDB for the years 1970-
2010 and the ACS for 2016. In the event that the non-Hispanic Black population is not available
in a tract-year, we follow the imputation procedure described above.
Overall tract characteristics.— Characteristics of the overall tract population (that is, not of a
particular race) are drawn directly from the LTDB and the 2014-2018 ACS. These characteristics
are: median household income, share of occupied households, and share of college educated adults.
We adjust incomes to 2018 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers
Characteristics by race.— We also include information on race-specific values of median
household income, college education, and poverty. While race-specific tract poverty rates are
available in all years, race-specific income and education rates are not. To construct them, we
draw the closest available variabls from IPUMS and again follow the imputation process described
above. For example, suppose that we observed tract median income for Black households, but
not non-Hispanic Black households. We would use the microdata to calculate the ratio between
median income for non-Hispanic Black households and all Black households in a tract’s county
and then multiply tract median Black income by this value.
In addition, there is a further complication in the years 1970 and 1980—household income
for different racial groups is not available. However, we do observe family income split by de-
mographic groups and household income for the overall population. We use this information to
estimate median household income by race in a slightly different way. First, we run a regression of
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median household income on median family income, the ratio between the number of families and
households, and the interaction between these two variables for the overall population. Then, as-
suming these parameters are constant across demographic groups, we predict the value of median
household income for each race using their respective explanatory variables. With these values in
hand, we adjust for Hispanic status in the same way that we adjust in other years.
Income bins for Black households—We draw the distribution of Black households across in-
come bins in each tract from IPUMS NHGIS. Due to data limitations, we use family income instead
of household income in 1980. We classify suppressed income bins as zeros. The bins available in
each year (not adjusted for inflation) are:
• 1970: less than 2,000; between 2,000 and 2,900; 3,000 and 4,999; 5,000 and 6,999; 7,000
and 9,999; 10,000 and 14,999; 15,000 and 24,999; 25,000 and more.
• 1980: less than 5,000; between 5,000 and 7,499; 7,500 and 9,999; 10,000 and 14,999; 15,000
and 19,999; 20,000 and 24,999; 25,000 and 34,999; 35,000 and 49,999; 50,000 and more.
• 1990: Less than 5,000; 5,000 to 9,999; 10,000 to 14,999; 15,000 to 24,999; 25,000 to 34,999;
35,000 to 49,999; 50,000 to 74,999; 75,000 to 99,999; 100,000 or more.
• 2000: Less than 10,000; 10,000 to 14,999; 15,000 to 19,999; 20,000 to 24,999; 25,000 to
29,999; 30,000 to 34,999; 35,000 to 39,999; 40,000 to 44,999; 45,000 to 49,999; 50,000
to 59,999; 60,000 to 74,999; 75,000 to 99,999; 100,000 to 124,999; 125,000 to 149,999;
150,000 to 199,999; 200,000 or more.
• 2010: Less than 10,000; 10,000 to 14,999; 15,000 to 19,999; 20,000 to 24,999; 25,000 to
29,999; 30,000 to 34,999; 35,000 to 39,999; 40,000 to 44,999; 45,000 to 49,999; 50,000
to 59,999; 60,000 to 74,999; 75,000 to 99,999; 100,000 to 124,999; 125,000 to 149,999;
150,000 to 199,999; 200,000 or more.
• 2016: Less than 10,000; 10,000 to 14,999; 15,000 to 19,999; 20,000 to 24,999; 25,000 to
29,999; 30,000 to 34,999; 35,000 to 39,999; 40,000 to 44,999; 45,000 to 49,999; 50,000
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to 59,999; 60,000 to 74,999; 75,000 to 99,999; 100,000 to 124,999; 125,000 to 149,999;
150,000 to 199,999; 200,000 or more.
I.B Panel of Tract Population in Age x Race Bins
In addition to the main tract panel, we also construct a tract-level dataset containing the population
of each race in five-year age bins from 0 to 74, as well as 75 and older. A variety of imputations
are required to obtain this information in each year, since the census regularly changes the age and
race bins that are released publicly. We again make these imputations by combining the available
tract data and the census/ACS microdata. For example, if we observe the number of Hispanics in
the age bin 20–30 in a tract in New York City, we use the share of Hispanics in their 20s that are
between 20 and 25 in New York city to compute the tract value for the 20–24 and 25–29 age bins.
Below is a description of the changes that must be made in each year of the sample.
• Year 1970: The data contain the correct age bins, but it does not distinguish non-Hispanic
and Hispanic Black/White from Hispanic Black/White. We use the microdata to estimate
the share Hispanic in each age bin.
• Year 1980: The data contain the desired race bins, but the age bins are 0–5, 5–17, 18–64, 65
or more. We use the microdata to estimate the share of each race x bin that falls into each
five-year bin.
• Year 1990: The original data contain age bins of 5 years or less, but there is not information
regarding the race of the Hispanic population. We again use the microdata to estimate the
share of Hispanic population in each age bin that are of a particular race.
• Years 2000–2010: The original data contain the desired age and race bins.
• Year 2016: NHGIS provides 10-year age bins for White, Black and Hispanic. We again
adjust using the microdata.
48
I.C Migration microdata
We use two data sources on migration. First, we use data from Infutor Data Systems to measure
migration flows between neighborhoods between 2010 and 2016. These data are described in
detail in Section 1.1 of the main text. Second, we use data from the 1980 and 1990 long-form
decennial censuses on place of residence five years ago and household demographic and economic
characteristics. This allows us to observe households that moved from a central city to one of
its suburbs. However, because the Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs) location identifiers in the
ACS do not necessarily align with municipal boundaries, we can only identify suburbanizers in
the following CBSAs: Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA/NH; Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY; Chicago, IL;
Cleveland, OH; Dallas-Fort Worth, TX; Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point, NC; Houston-
Brazoria, TX; Knoxville, TN; Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA; Memphis, TN/AR/MS; Minneapolis-
St. Paul, MN; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY-Northeastern NJ; Orlando, FL Philadelphia,
PA/NJ; Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, MA/RI; Richmond-Petersburg, VA; San Antonio, TX;




Given historical differences across regions in urban development, racial discrimination, and racial
disparities, one question is whether the patterns we document are driven by a particular region or
are similar throughout the country. In this section, we explore how some of our key results differ
across census regions (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South, and West).
We start by replicating Figure 1—the time series of aggregate Black population in cities and
suburbs—separately for each census region in Appendix Figure A17. This figure shows that the
broad patterns in Figure 1 are similar across regions, with every region having a large decline in the
share of Black households living in central cities and a rise in the suburbs. The magnitudes differ
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across regions, with the rise in the share of Black households living in the suburbs being smaller
in the West and particularly large in the Midwest and the South. The Black population share living
outside of originally large cities is also larger in the West than in other regions, likely because the
West had a greater number of areas that grew rapidly during this time period.
In Appendix Figure A18, we perform this same replication by region for Figure 3, which shows
the change in Black household income relative to White households overall and for households
living in central cities and their suburbs. We again see that the general pattern of falling relative
income for Black households in central cities, along with rising average and suburban relative
incomes, generally holds in most regions. In all regions, the majority of improvement in relative
neighborhood incomes is driven by suburbanization. In most regions, this is entirely driven by
rising relative neighborhood incomes in the suburbs and a rising share of households living in the
suburbs. The exception is the West region, where relative Black neighborhood incomes in central
cities do rise throughout the sample period. Still, even in the West, the majority of the increase in
the average appears to be driven by the rising share of Black households living in the suburbs.
Finally, in Appendix Figure A19, we perform the income segregation exercise from Figure 6
separately for each region. The aggregate trend again seems to hold in every region, although
increasing segregation within cities has played a larger role in the West than in other regions.
On the whole, breaking these results out by region suggests that the overall patterns we find are
replicated throughout the United States and are not driven by idiosyncratic patterns in a particular
region. Similarly, Figure 2 and Appendix Figures A3, A4, and A5 plot maps of Black population
change in the largest CBSA in each region. All look quite similar. Finally, Appendix Figure A6
shows that large cities across all regions lost total Black population between 2000 and 2016.
50
II.B Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Change in Distribution of White Population Since 1970
Panel A: Share of White Population
Panel B: Total White Population
Notes: Total and share of White population in large central cities, their suburbs, and other areas. Largest 40 cities
is defined as the central cities of the most populous 20 CBSAs in southern states and in all other states, as measured
in 1970. Suburbs are defined as the CBSAs containing these cities, less the principal city itself. Municipalities and
CBSAs are consistently defined according to 2010 boundaries. We assign areas that had not been assigned to a census
tract in 1970 or 1980 to the other areas category, inferring their population from the national White population.
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Figure A2: Change in Distribution of Hispanic Population Since 1970
Panel A: Share of Hispanic Population
Panel B: Total White Population
Notes: Total and share of Hispanic population in large central cities, their suburbs, and other areas. Largest 40 cities
is defined as the central cities of the most populous 20 CBSAs in southern states and in all other states, as measured
in 1970. Suburbs are defined as the CBSAs containing these cities, less the principal city itself. Municipalities and
CBSAs are consistently defined according to 2010 boundaries. We assign areas that had not been assigned to a census
tract in 1970 or 1980 to the other areas category, inferring their population from the national Hispanic population.
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Figure A3: Black population in Chicago metro
Panel A: Census tract Black population in 1970
Panel B: Census tract Black population in 2016
Notes: Total Black population by census tract in the Chicago CBSA in 1970 (Panel A) and 2016 (Panel B). Tracts
with 0–40 Black individuals are shown in dark blue; 40–200, light blue; 200–1,000, beige; 1,000–2,000, orange; and
2,000–10,000, red. Data are drawn from the 1970 census and the 2014–2018 ACS. Census tract boundaries are from
2010. Black lines represent county boundaries.
53
Figure A4: Black population in Houston metro
Panel A: Census tract Black population in 1970
Panel B: Census tract Black population in 2016
Notes: Total Black population by census tract in the Houston CBSA in 1970 (Panel A) and 2016 (Panel B). Tracts
with 0–40 Black individuals are shown in dark blue; 40–200, light blue; 200–1,000, beige; 1,000–2,000, orange; and
2,000–10,000, red. Data are drawn from the 1970 census and the 2014–2018 ACS. Census tract boundaries are from
2010. Black lines represent county boundaries.
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Figure A5: Black population in New York metro
Panel A: Census tract Black population in 1970
Panel B: Census tract Black population in 2016
Notes: Note: Total Black population by census tract in the New York CBSA in 1970 (Panel A) and 2016 (Panel B).
Tracts with 0–40 Black individuals are shown in dark blue; 40–200, light blue; 200–1,000, beige; 1,000–2,000, orange;
and 2,000–10,000, red. Data are drawn from the 1970 census and the 2014–2018 ACS. Census tract boundaries are
from 2010. Black lines represent county boundaries.
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Figure A6: Black Population Decline in Major Cities
Notes: This figure shows the Black population in major central cities since 2000. The 13 central cities with the largest
Black population in 1970 are included. Data for 2000 and 2010 come from the decennial census, while data for 2016
come from the 2014–2018 ACS.
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Figure A7: Native Black Population Decline in Major Cities
Notes: This figure shows the U.S.-born Black population in major central cities since 2000. The 13 central cities with
the largest Black population in 1970 are included. Data for 2000 and 2010 come from the decennial census, while data
for 2016 come from the 2014–2018 ACS.
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Figure A8: Time Series of Neighborhood Types of Black Individuals
Panel A: Suburban Tracts Race Types Panel B: Central City Tracts Race Types
Panel C: Suburban Tracts Income Types Panel D: Central City Tracts Income Types
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of Black individuals living in different categories of census tracts, separately
central cities and suburbs. Panels A and B report the distribution of tract racial composition in suburbs and central
cities, respectively. Panels C and D do the same for tracts in ranges of median incomes. Data come from the 1970 to
2000 decennial census long forms and the 2008–2012 and 2014–2018 ACS. This exercise uses our primary sample of
40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure A9: 1970–2016 Black population growth versus 1970 characteristics (suburban tracts)
Panel A: Median household income Panel B: Poverty rate
Panel C: Vacancy rate Panel D: Percent White
Notes:. This figure plots the relationship between 1970 characteristics of suburban tracts and the median change in
tract total Black population between 1970 and 2016. Panel A shows the relationship with 1970 tract median household
income; Panel B, poverty rate; Panel C, vacancy rate; and Panel D, percent White. Data come from the 1970 decennial
census and the 2014–2018 ACS. This exercise uses the suburban tracts in our primary sample.
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Figure A10: Selection of Suburbanizers from Cities
Notes: This figure plots the distributions of household income for Black households that suburbanized (solid gray
rectangles) in the five years prior to the 1980 or 1990 censuses versus those who remained in central cities (hollow
red rectangles). Suburbanizers are defined as moving from a central city to its suburbs. Data come from the 1980
and 1990 decennnial censuses. Only a subset of the CBSAs in our primary sample are included because the loca-
tion identifiers in the census data do not always uniquely identify migrants from a city to its suburbs. More details
are provided in Appendix I. The CBSAs included are Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA/NH; Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY;
Chicago, IL; Cleveland, OH; Dallas-Fort Worth, TX; Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point, NC; Houston-Brazoria,
TX; Knoxville, TN; Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA; Memphis, TN/AR/MS; Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN; New Orleans,
LA; New York, NY-Northeastern NJ; Orlando, FL Philadelphia, PA/NJ; Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, MA/RI;
Richmond-Petersburg, VA; San Antonio, TX; San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA; Seattle-Everett, WA; Norfolk-VA
Beach–Newport News, VA; Washington, DC/MD/VA.
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Figure A11: Decomposition of Rise in Black Suburban Share
Notes: This figure decomposes the change in the share of Black households living in the suburbs between 1970 and
2016 into the change driven by changes in the income distribution of Black households and changes in the suburban
share within income cells. The blue line with circular points shows the change in the actual suburban share for Black
households. The red line with square points shows the implied change in the suburban share from freezing the Black
income distribution at its 1970 value and allowing the suburban share within income bins to change. The green line
with diamond points shows the implied change in the suburban share from freezing the suburban share within income
bins and allowing the income distribution to change. Data come from the 1970 to 2000 decennial census long forms
and the 2008–2012 and 2014–2018 ACS. This exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure A12: Change in Mean Income Among Black Households in Cities and Suburbs
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of mean Black household income (in $2018) between 1970 and 2016 sepa-
rately for central cities (blue, circle points) and suburbs (red, square points). To compute the mean, we use data on the
number of Black households in each tract in a set of income bins. We then set household income in each cell at its
midpoint. Data come from the 1970 to 2000 decennial census long forms and the 2008–2012 and 2014–2018 ACS.
This exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure A13: Share of Black High-Earners in High-Poverty Tracts
Notes: This figure shows the share of Black high-earners (households with income above $100k in 2018 dollars) who
live in high-poverty census tracts (defined as poverty rates greater than 20%). The sample average is shown in blue,
the average for high earners in central cities is shown in red and the average for high earners suburbs is shown with
the dotted green line. The contemporaneous federal poverty threshold is used in each year. We identify high earners
as those in income bins with midpoint above $100,000 (inflation adjusted to 2018). Data come from the 1970 to 2000
decennial census long forms and the 2008–2012 and 2014–2018 ACS. This exercise uses our primary sample of 40
large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure A14: High-SES, Majority Black Tracts that were Majority Black in 1970
Panel A: Median Income Above Sample Median
Panel B: College Share Above Sample Median
Notes: This figure shows the number of census tracts that are majority Black and either high income (Panel A) or high
education (Panel B) among all neighborhoods and those that were majority-Black in 1970. High-income is defined
as having tract median income above the median value in the sample, and high-education is defined analogously for
share of residents over age 25 that have at least a bachelor’s degree. In both panels, the light gray area represents the
number of tracts that fit the definition and were majority Black in 1970, while the dark gray shows the total number of
tracts that fit the given definition. The exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure A15: Age Distribution of Black Population in Central Cities
Panel A: Black Versus White City Populations in 1970
Panel B: Black City Populations in 1970 Versus 2016
Notes: This figure shows the age distributions of the Black and White population in central cities in 1970 (Panel A)
and the Black population in central cities in 1970 and 2016 (Panel B). Data come from the 1970 decennial census and
the 2014–2018 ACS. This exercise uses the 40 large central cities included in our primary sample.
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Figure A16: Central City Shortfall from Predicted Population by Age and Race
Notes: This figure shows the shortfall between predicted natural population growth and observed population growth
for the Black, White, and Hispanic populations in central cities. The left panel shows the shortfall for people under age
35, while the right panel shows it for people over 35. As described in Section 4, predicted population growth rates for
year t are constructed by taking the true population age distribution in time t− 10, mechanically aging the population
in each five-year age bin, assuming people die and give birth at the average rate for that decade, and assuming that
net-migration is zero for each age group. The predicted population growth rate is then: popsimulated,t−popobserved,t-10popobserved,t-10 . Actual
population by age comes from the 1970 to 2000 decennial censuses and 2008–2012 and 2014–2018 ACS. Race-age
specific fertility rates in each year are taken from the Census Bureau. Age-specific mortality rates come from the
Center for Disease Control. This sample includes the 40 large central cities in our primary sample.
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Figure A17: Change in Distribution of Black Population Since 1970 by Region
Notes: Total and share of Black population in large central cities, their suburbs, and other areas, separately for each
census region. Largest 40 cities is defined as the central cities of the most populous 20 CBSAs in southern states and
in all other states, as measured in 1970. Suburbs are defined as the CBSAs containing these cities, less the principal
city itself. Municipalities and CBSAs are consistently defined according to 2010 boundaries. We assign areas that had
not been assigned to a census tract in 1970 or 1980 to the other areas category, inferring their population from the total
Black population in the census region.
67
Figure A18: Neighborhood Income for Black Individuals Relative to White Individuals by Region
Notes: This figure plots, separately for each census region, the time series of average neighborhood median house-
hold income for Black individuals divided by the same statistic for White individuals. The blue line contains Black
individuals in all sample tracts in the region, while the green and red lines include only Black individuals in the suburbs
and cities, respectively. In all cases, neighborhood income among White individuals (the denominator) includes all
tracts in the full national sample. Census tract income data come from the 1970 to 2000 decennial censuses and the
2008-2012 and 2014-2018 ACS. The exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large cities and their suburbs.
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Figure A19: Change in Income Segregation Within Black Households by Region
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) income segregation index within Black
households from 1970 to 2016, separately for each census region. The index can be interpreted as the share of the
variation in household income that is between census tracts. The blue line shows the actual evolution of this index,
while the red line shows the evolution under the counterfactual assumption that the share of Black households living
in the suburbs and the income segregation of Black households in suburban tracts both remained frozen at their 1970
values. The index is computed using census and ACS data on the distribution of Black households across income
bins within census tracts, as detailed in Appendix I. The exercise uses our primary sample of 40 large cities and their
suburbs.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics on Census Tracts in Primary Sample
Area Year Total Pop. Black White Hispanic Other High-poverty tracts Majority-Black tracts Total tracts
City 1970 35.49 9.20 22.44 3.22 0.63 2255 1886 9790
City 1980 33.22 9.99 17.40 4.60 1.23 3405 2445 9790
City 1990 34.03 10.16 15.53 6.45 1.88 3972 2602 9790
City 2000 35.87 10.74 13.47 8.61 3.05 4360 2780 9790
City 2010 36.06 9.95 12.66 9.94 3.50 4927 2673 9790
City 2016 37.83 9.59 13.03 10.75 4.46 4515 2468 9790
Suburb 1970 56.53 3.49 50.51 2.05 0.48 1238 553 22695
Suburb 1980 68.11 5.47 57.04 4.07 1.54 1275 850 22695
Suburb 1990 80.56 7.41 62.96 7.15 3.03 1835 1100 22695
Suburb 2000 93.33 10.48 65.10 11.81 5.94 1953 1377 22695
Suburb 2010 104.50 13.69 64.69 17.75 8.38 3604 1600 22695
Suburb 2016 110.48 14.19 64.45 20.55 11.29 3301 1572 22695
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of the census tracts included in our primary sample, stratified by year and central city status. Population counts are in
millions, and the Black, White, Hispanic, and Other columns show the total population of that group. High-poverty tracts shows the number of tracts that have a
poverty rate over 20%, and majority-Black count is the number that are over half Black. Finally, tract count is the total number of sample tracts in cities or suburbs
in a given year.
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Table A2: Number of City and Suburban Tracts in Sample CBSAs
CBSA Title City tracts Suburban tracts
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 2214 2432
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 986 1921
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 790 1412
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 424 644
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 391 930
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 376 1088
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 307 666
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 293 996
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 268 358
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 260 195
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 206 222
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 199 476
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 195 593
Kansas City, MO-KS 187 329
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 179 1173
Cleveland-Elyria, OH 174 458
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 174 822
New Orleans-Metairie, LA 173 222
Jacksonville, FL 162 96
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 156 155
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 151 385
Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 146 232
Pittsburgh, PA 131 574
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 131 587
El Paso, TX 123 38
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 117 830
St. Louis, MO-IL 106 509
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 99 313
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 89 407
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 89 1112
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 88 648
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 79 217
Richmond, VA 66 226
Greensboro-High Point, NC 52 115
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 48 215
Winston-Salem, NC 46 104
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 39 326
Knoxville, TN 37 165
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 24 365
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 15 139
Notes: This table shows the number of city and suburban tracts in each CBSA in our primary sample.
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Table A3: Black Population in Central City Tracts by Gentrification Status


















Gentrified All 1.56 1.36 1.34 1.41 1.32 1.24 -0.17 -0.12 0.14
Gentrified Normal 0.84 0.75 0.74 0.80 0.80 0.77 -0.04 -0.05 0.03
Gentrified Superstar 0.72 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.48 -0.13 -0.21 0.11
Not Gentrified All 7.64 8.62 8.83 9.33 8.63 8.35 -0.98 -0.11 0.85
Not Gentrified Normal 5.26 6.01 6.16 6.56 6.03 5.84 -0.72 -0.11 0.63
Not Gentrified Superstar 2.38 2.61 2.66 2.77 2.60 2.51 -0.26 -0.09 0.23
Notes: This table reports the time series of Black population in central city neighborhoods according to whether they gentrified between 1970 and 2016.
Gentrification is defined (at the tract level) as having neighborhood median income below the MSA median in 1970 and above it in 2016. Totals are reported in
millions, as is the level change. Percentages are reported between 0 and 1. Share of aggregate 2000–2016 change represents the share of the total decline across all
tract types that is accounted for by that tract type. Superstar cities are defined as Boston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington.
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